Abstract: A central claim of Deleuze's reading of Bergson is that Bergson's distinction between space as an extensive multiplicity and duration as an intensive multiplicity is inspired by the distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds found in Bernhard Riemann's 1854 thesis on the foundations of geometry. Yet there is no evidence from Bergson that Riemann influences his division, and the distinction between the discrete and continuous is hardly a Riemannian invention. Claiming Riemann's influence, however, allows Deleuze to argue that quantity, in the form of 'virtual number', still pertains to continuous multiplicities. This not only supports Deleuze's attempt to redeem Bergson's argument against Einstein in Duration and Simultaneity, but also allows Deleuze to position Bergson against Hegelian dialectics. The use of Riemann is thereby an important element of the incorporation of Bergson into Deleuze's larger early project of developing an antiHegelian philosophy of difference.
and that 'if magnitude, outside you, is never intensive, intensity, within you, is never magnitude' (225). However, from Matter and Memory onwards Bergson proposes various rapprochements between the terms he initially considered entirely different in kind, building on the idea that 'the interval between quantity and quality [might] be lessened by considerations of tension' (Bergson 1991: 183) . This leads him, on the one hand, to propose an inverse relation between quantitative space and qualitative duration in which the latter constitutes the former as an effect of its force of becoming (élan vital) , and, on the other hand, to suggest the possibility of multiple levels or paces of duration. The two ideas follow from the same implications Bergson draws from the way modern physics understands extensive movements as composed of microscopic continuous vibrations of forces (196) (197) (198) (199) (200) (201) .
From this, he argues that the reality of the numbers attached to the frequencies of these forces -in the case of red light, some 400 billion vibrations per second -presupposes a duration that is sufficiently relaxed so as to be able to tally them , and thus to the conclusion that 'we must distinguish here between our own duration and time in general ' (206) . Yet, as Deleuze notes, these developments in Bergson's thought open him to the criticism that he reintroduces extensity into duration. It also leaves unexplained Bergson's apparent regression back to psychologism and the absolute separation of time and space in his argument against Einstein in Duration and Simultaneity (Bergson 1999) , where he declares that the frequencies by which physics interprets the universe to be a mathematical fiction and insists on there being only one pace of lived duration (Bergson 1999: 25, 32) . Claiming Riemann's influence allows Deleuze to respond to all of these issues by holding that an unextended or intensive form of quantity still pertains to duration as a qualitative continuous multiplicity. This supports Deleuze's attempt in Bergsonism (Deleuze 1991a ) to redeem Bergson's argument in Duration and Simultaneity by holding that it is directed only towards what Bergson sees as Einstein's misuses of extensive quantity to understand time. It also supports Deleuze's more general attempt to present Bergsonian duration as offering a concept of difference within a monistic ontology. This latter side of Deleuze's reading also allows him to claim that duration involves an internal difference superior to the internal difference conceived by Hegel as speculative contradiction, and thus to employ Bergson to advance his own anti-Hegelian philosophy.
Deleuze's early critiques of Hegel, implicit in his reading of Hume (Deleuze 1991b ) and explicit in several readings of Bergson, turn on the idea that contradiction or opposition is an external relation applying only to already actualised terms, leaving unexplained the constitution of both these terms and the extensity they occupy. Treating the external relation of opposition as though it were a constitutive internal difference leaves dialectics abstract, as it is 'always composing movement from points of view, as a relation between actual terms instead of seeing in it the actualization of something virtual' (Deleuze 2004: 28) . The virtual here is a domain of constitutive differences that are fully real but not susceptible to representation, differences that for Bergson relate to the temporality that makes things what they are. For Deleuze, duration, in contrast to dialectical opposition, is a virtual difference, unextended and immanent to the entities it infuses, that grasps 'the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its internal difference' (32); but it also, as Deleuze argues with regards to Bergson's late works, accounts for the extensity and spatiality in which actual things come to be seen as distinct and opposed. In this way, duration, understood as a continuous multiplicity, constitutes an extensity that is, in Riemannian terms, a discrete manifold.
Conceptualising such an intensive continuous domain and how it constitutes extensity, however, has nothing to do with Riemann's project. Rather, Riemann seeks to outline the general foundations of domains of multiply-extended magnitudes, whose constituent components may be either discrete or continuous, and he is agnostic about the real structure of space, which indeed is only one such domain of extended magnitudes. In these ways and others, his project differs substantially from Bergson's -and Deleuze's -even while Deleuze marshals it to support both Bergson's project and his own. Despite these differences, Deleuze finds a positive way to adapt Riemann's thought to support his reading and defence of
Bergson. Yet it is also from the product of this Bergson-Riemann combination that Deleuze plots a course beyond both of them through the idea of immanent intensive discontinuities within continuous multiplicities.
The following will first review Riemann's concept of the manifold, its use in establishing the foundations of an intrinsic geometry, and how Riemann's concluding discussion of space sets the stage both for the development of Einstein's general theory of relativity and Deleuze's adaption of Riemann in his reading of Bergson. It will then outline how Deleuze uses Riemann's thesis to support his early Bergsonism. Finally, it will explore the limits of this move, and how Deleuze's later turn from Bergson relates to a rejection of a crucial assumption of Riemann's analysis, that of 'flatness in smallest parts', developing these final thoughts by examining Deleuze's deployment of the 'irrational cut', an idea he takes from Riemann's contemporary, the mathematician Richard Dedekind.
I. Riemann on Discrete and Continuous Manifolds
Riemann's thesis concerns 'the general concept of multiply extended magnitudes [der Begriff mehrfach ausgedehnter Grössen], in which spatial magnitudes are comprehended', and seeks to construct 'the concept of a multiply extended magnitude [Grösse] out of general notions of quantity [Grössenbegriffen] ' (Riemann 1929: 411 Whilst experience indicates the high probability that Euclidean propositions are valid within the observable domain, it is a separate matter to decide 'the admissibility of protracting them outside the limits of observation, not only toward the immeasurably large, but also toward the immeasurably small' (412). Riemann, as already noted, is agnostic about whether physical space is discrete or continuous, holding this to be an empirical question belonging to the science of physics (424-5). Regardless, his subject is magnitudes that are extended, divisible and quantifiable.
The general notions of quantity from which the concept of multiply extended magnitudes is constructed presuppose 'a general concept which allows various modes of determination' (Riemann 1929: 412) . This is the concept of the manifold (Manningfaltigkeit), which denotes a domain of forms or elements organised along multiple dimensions. Riemann introduces this as a philosophical and not merely mathematical concept. 4 Depending on whether one can progress from one of the manifold's constituents to another by way of an unbroken path or not, the mode of determination will yield a manifold that is either continuous or discrete, and the manifold will be quantified accordingly. A discrete manifold comprises a collection of elements to be enumerated, like leaves on a tree or animals on a farm -or, in the case of space, if it were held to be composed of atomic units, as some of the ancients believed, or to be constituted so as to be isomorphic with a compact, well-ordered infinity of mathematical points, as Russell (1926) maintains. In 'the doctrine of discrete quantities', mathematicians can 'set out without scruple from the postulate that given things are to be considered as all of one kind' (Riemann 1929: 413 consistent, and even then it would ultimately depend -as Riemann goes on to assume -on there being lines of sufficiently small magnitude to be superposable onto any part of the manifold. In the absence even of this uniformity, however, there would be no way to carry forward one magnitude as the measure of another, meaning that two magnitudes could only be compared if one were already part of the other, and, with no consistency in the manifold to allow the larger merely to be a multiple of the smaller, the determination of the two magnitudes could only be of more or less without any specification of by how much.
Investigations of these last cases, Riemann holds, 'form a general part of the doctrine of quantity independent of metric determinations, where magnitudes are thought of not as existing independent of position and not as expressible by a unit, but only as regions in a manifold' (413). Rather than exploring the matter further, however, he states that he will only draw from these considerations answers to the questions of how to conceive the construction of multiply extended magnitudes and how to move from the determination of positions in them to determinations of quantity (413). In this way, Riemann restricts himself to cases of manifolds where metric determinations are possible.
Riemann goes on first to investigate determinations of measure within a regular manifold or region of manifold. Such determinations 'require magnitude to be independent of location' (Riemann 1929: 415) and thus assume that 'the length of lines be independent of their situation, that therefore every line be measurable by every other ' (415-16) . They further assume that at an 'indefinitely small' (419) This would imply, however, that whatever measurements might obtain in the observable domain would not be grounded in the procedures of integration, and other considerations would be needed to account for this reality.
The possibility that flatness in smallest parts does not hold, the implications of which Riemann had set aside in order to examine manifolds for which metric relations not only of more or less but also of how much are possible, thus leads on to 'the question concerning the ultimate basis of relations of size in space' (Riemann 1929: 424) . In this respect, <EXT> while in a discrete manifold the principle of metric relations is implicit in the notion of this manifold, it must come from somewhere else in the case of a continuous manifold. Either then the actual things forming the groundwork of a space must constitute a discrete manifold, or else the basis of metric relations must be sought for outside that actuality, in colligating forces that operate upon it. (424-5).
If space were really composed of discrete elements, then all measurements would be reduced to matters of counting, and thus the principle of space's metric relations would be found in the very notion of its extension. If space were really continuous, however, then this principle would have to be imposed from the outside and with regard to the forces that bind space together. The latter case could entail forces composing space in a way that allowed for division into arbitrary but standard units of measure -that is, these forces might constitute space in a continuous but regular form that would accord with the postulates of Euclidean geometry -or in a way that made all units of measure vary locally. Contrary to the position Riemann draws from observation, wherein Euclidean assumptions hold, Einstein's general theory of relativity uses Riemann's analysis to maintain that the metric principle for space comes from the bodies that occupy it, with the gravitational forces of each body curving space and thus determining its metrical principle within the region of its movement. It is notable that this answer applies only to macroscopic reality and not the infinitesimal world that prompted Riemann to ask his final question, and Einstein of course was never able to marry general relativity to the rules of the quantum world of discrete energy states, nonlocality, and indeterminacy, to whose discovery he also contributed so much.
II. Deleuze's reading of Bergson through Riemann
When Deleuze links Bergson to Riemann, he does so in reference to Riemann's final point on the metric principle in discrete versus continuous manifolds: number implies a visual image in space; and the direct study of the units which go to form a discrete multiplicity will lead us to the same conclusion on this point as the examination of number itself' (79) -would be absurd unless they meant to follow Riemann' for the past to be constituted as it would then not be possible for a future present to arrive to replace it; these impasses can only be resolved if the present is virtually past 'at the same time' as it is actually present (Deleuze 1991a: 59-60 Virtual internal difference thus constitutes an actuality that, while extended, discrete, and quantifiable, remains characterised by difference and novelty. Actualisation is responsible for both sides of this actuality because it gives rise to the matter that opposes creative duration.
Deleuze here draws particularly on Creative Evolution, where Bergson explains the relation between duration and matter through the image of the jet of stream thrust into the air, with the droplets forming through condensation being likened to actualised matter that falls back against and hinders the virtual steam jet even while the latter's force continues to drive both them and itself upwards (Bergson 1998: 247) ; in this way, duration and matter are portrayed as being inversely related (201). For Deleuze, duration is internal difference, while matter is this same difference relaxed and extended until it becomes a difference outside itself, and so part of a discrete multiplicity. This might seem to contradict Deleuze's use of relaxation and contraction to describe the relation between the virtual past and actual present, since there the actual present is the virtual at its most contracted whereas here actual matter is the virtual at its most relaxed. But these refer to different processes: in its actualisation, the present is the most contracted form of the virtual past, compressed to the point where it burst forward in creative evolution; while in its actuality, as matter and space, it is duration and difference externalised and then coming into opposition not only with other actual entities but with duration's own élan vital. Actuality seems to be nothing more than a discrete world of entities in extensity only when the contracted force of actualisation is forgotten. For Deleuze, these ways of relating virtual and actual in terms of contraction and relaxation resolve the seemingly irreconcilable dualisms Bergson establishes between differences in kind and difference of degree, quality and quantity, perception and recollection, past and present, memory and matter. The dualisms reflect a method that identifies differences in kind by separating them from differences of degree, carving up the given according to lines of articulation or tendencies (see Deleuze 1991a: 44-5; 2004: 33-4) . But this external difference in kind between differences in kind and differences of degree -that is, between internal difference in itself and internal difference externalised into space -ultimately becomes a monism as one tendency is identified as the condition of possibility of the other: 'if there is a privileged half in the division [into tendencies]; it must be that this half contains in itself the secret of the other' (Deleuze 2004: 27) . Thus both sides of the initial dualism turn out to be durational, each differing from its apparent contrary in terms of relative contraction and relaxation, so that the dualism of actual tendencies becomes a monism at the level of their virtual unity (Deleuze 1991a: 93) .
Contraction and relaxation also differentiate orders of lived duration above and below the pace lived by human consciousness -a thesis Bergson advances particularly in Matter and
Memory but notably rejects in Duration and Simultaneity -with Deleuze contending that these different rhythms of duration nevertheless belong to a single Time (Deleuze 1991a: 76-8, 82-5) . However, as Deleuze acknowledges, everything Bergson criticises now seems to return to the heart of his philosophy, as the differences of contraction and relaxation appear to be nothing more than the quantitative differences of degree -that is, intensive magnitudesof the very sort Bergson associates with abstract and faulty discrete multiplicities being used to interpret qualitative internal difference, but now embedded in the virtual differentiation meant as their replacement (75-6). Deleuze responds by holding that duration's levels of contraction and dilation amount to 'degrees of difference' rather than differences of degree (93), and as such introduce a new notion of quantity specific to the virtual. Here, the claim that Bergson's continuous multiplicities, being Riemannian in character, find their metric principles in the forces binding them together, is cashed out by Deleuze in the notion that 'one of Bergson's more curious ideas is that difference itself has a number, a virtual number, a numbering number' (Deleuze 2004: 34) , and that for Bergson, 'there are numbers enclosed in qualities, intensities included in duration' (Deleuze 1991a: 92) . Unlike differences of degree, which involve extensive and discrete magnitudes and thus fixed numerical differences between them, the virtual number associated with degrees of difference would change with each difference made as the virtual is creatively actualised. Virtual intensive quantity, then, would accord with Riemann's situations where, in the absence of a fixed standard of measure, two magnitudes can be compared only when one is part of the other, and even then only in terms of more or less but not how much 10 -situations, in short, where magnitudes are not independent of position but rather depend upon the forces that act upon and hold together this multiplicity. Duration expresses such a situation as it immediately differs from itself, changing continuously and qualitatively with the syntheses of the past that compose it and the élan vital that actualises it. Virtual quantity refers to the tendencies or forces of differentiation correlated with this actualisation.
III. Moving beyond Bergson and Riemann: the 'irrational cut'
If duration as a continuous multiplicity invokes an intensive quantity involving a more or less but not how much, then it would seem to entail the corollary suggested by Riemann of a situation where flatness in smallest parts cannot be assumed, and so a domain of quantity that is 'independent of metric determinations' and 'not … expressible by a unit' (Riemann 1929: 413 Bergson's critique of intensive quantity 'seems unconvincing' because Bergson has 'already attributed to quality everything that belongs to intensive quantities' (Deleuze 1994: 239) , he quickly offers degrees of difference as a way to recover Bergson's position, holding these really to be differences of intensity within a synthesis of duration that engenders both quality and extensity (239-40). But the Bergsonian account of intensity Deleuze provides here is limited on his own broader terms, as Bergson's is a 'great synthesis of Memory' (239) and is thereby associated with only the second of three syntheses that Deleuze employs to explain the constitution of both time and space (70-128; 229-30) . This second synthesis concerns the implication of intensity in the extensities that explicate it (230) and how this implication grounds the extensity in which intensive quantities seem to disappear. But intensity, Deleuze contends, is implicated first of all in itself, whereby it 'includes the unequal in itself' (232) and announces a 'universal "ungrounding"' (230). This intensity is moreover linked to a prequantitative and pre-qualitative power of individuation and dramatisation that determines the actualisation of the virtual. 11 It is defined by three aspects: 'the enveloping difference, the enveloped distances, and the unequal in itself which testifies to the existence of a natural Dedekind's thesis concerns continuity and the notion of irrational numbers needed to complete a mathematical account of it. These are crucial for the infinitesimal analysis upon which Riemann's own thesis depends, 'and yet an explanation of this continuity is nowhere given' (Dedekind 1963: 2) . Furthermore, the introduction of irrational numbers 'is based directly upon the conception of extensive magnitudes -which itself is nowhere carefully defined -and explains number as the result of measuring such a magnitude by another of the same kind' (9-10). Against this, Dedekind demands that both the continuum and irrational numbers are 'established in a purely arithmetic manner' (2), whereby 'arithmetic shall be developed out of itself' (10).
Deriving rational numbers by arithmetic means is straightforward, as Dedekind regards 'the whole of arithmetic as a necessary, or at least natural, consequence of the simplest arithmetic act, that of counting ' (Dedekind 1963: 4) . Although the limitations arising from subtraction and division each require 'a new creative act' (4) in the form of the inventions of negative numbers and fractions respectively, ultimately 'the system of all rational numbers … denote [d] by R' (4-5) 12 follows directly from 'the four fundamental operations of arithmetic' (4). The completeness of this system is confirmed by the fact that, with the exception of division by 0, the four operations can be performed using any two rational numbers and will always yield a rational number (5). But the system is further characterised by the property of forming 'a well-arranged domain of one dimension extending to infinity on two opposite sides' (5). This means that each rational number separates the entire system into two exclusive classes, one containing all rational numbers less than the given number and the other containing all rational numbers greater than it, with the number itself being freely assignable as either the highest of the first class or the lowest of the second (6). Each such division corresponds to one number only, as the classes formed by any two distinct numbers cannot be the same regardless of their proximity to each other.
Dedekind then compares the rational number system to the points of a straight line, declaring that the analogy between them 'becomes a real correspondence when we select upon the straight line a definite origin or zero-point 0 and a definite unit of length for the measurement of segments' (Dedekind 1963: 7-8) . Extensive magnitude and measurement by superposition of magnitudes are thereby introduced, but the geometric image is derived from the arithmetic deduction of the number system, not the reverse. But this is not the case for the introduction of irrational numbers. The fact that between any two rational numbers lies infinitely many other rational numbers (6) might seem to indicate a complete correspondence of that rational number system to the continuous straight line, but for the ancient Greeks' discovery of the incommensurability of the square with its diagonal, which entails that an arc drawn from the end point of the diagonal onto a horizontal number line extending from and measuring the square's base will intersect that straight line at a point corresponding to no rational number (8) (9) . This demonstrates that 'in the straight line L there are infinitely many points which correspond to no rational number' (8), meaning that 'the straight line L is infinitely richer in point-individuals than the domain R of rational numbers in number-individuals' (9). It is therefore necessary to construct a new domain of numbers that 'shall gain the same completeness, or as we may say at once, the same continuity, as the straight line' (9). This is 'the system ℜ of all real numbers' (19), which includes all rational and irrational numbers.
Despite geometric considerations providing 'the immediate occasion' for this extension, they are not themselves 'sufficient ground for introducing these foreign notions into arithmetic, the science of numbers' (10). Dedekind thus declares: 'we must endeavor completely to define irrational numbers by means of the rational numbers alone' (10).
This context of defining irrationals leads Dedekind to introduce the idea of 'a cut [Schnitt]'
(Dedekind 1963: 13) in a number system. It was prefigured by the idea that each rational number separates its system R into two distinct infinite classes, with the separating number assignable to either class, but importantly that property did not define the rational numbers themselves, as they were already derived from the basic arithmetic operations. In contrast, although once introduced the property of cutting applies to both rational and irrational numbers, it is the basis for defining the latter as an extension of the former. Moreover, it is used to define the continuity the real number system must demonstrate, Dedekind summing this up, again by way of geometric reference, as follows: 'If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every point of the first class lies to the left of every point of the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions' (11). Each rational number is seen to enact two cuts, one in which it is the highest of the lower class it creates and the other in which it is the lowest of the other class, but these two cuts are 'only unessentially different' (17). In contrast, two distinct numbers, be they rational or irrational, are considered 'different or unequal always and only when they correspond to essentially different cuts' (15), which means when, in addition to the cutting number, there is at least one other number that belongs in the higher class for the cuts made by one number and the lower class for the cuts made by the other (17).
Dedekind proceeds to demonstrate 'that there are infinitely many cuts not produced by rational numbers' (13). The numbers corresponding to these cuts are specified through the proposition of a positive integer D whose square root is not an integer; it follows that the root falls between two consecutive integers, λ and λ+1, whose squares will be less than and greater than D respectively. The root of D will divide the number line such that all positive rational numbers whose squares are greater than D will be greater than D's square root, while all other rational numbers, be they positive or negative, will by implication be less than the root. The root itself, however, will not be a rational number, as demonstrated by indirect proof (13-15). 13 These irrational numbers, Dedekind holds, fill the gaps 'between' rational numbers, and the classes of rational numbers greater and less than the irrational number now said to cut between them will approach but never reach this irrational. In this way, irrational numbers serve as limits of convergent series of rational numbers, but this threatens the idea of continuity inasmuch as the irrational number itself will be unassignable to either class.
Nevertheless, the unique place of each irrational number, required to demonstrate that the real number system is both well-ordered on one dimension and continuous, follows from there necessarily being an infinity of rational numbers lying between any irrational number and any other rational or irrational number, so that no two numbers, rational or irrational, will cut the real number system into the same two classes; with that, every real number will be freely assignable to either of the classes their cuts create (20-1). 14 Just as arithmetic operations with rational numbers yield definitive results, so too with real numbers, conceived as cuts: the sum of two numbers, for example, will be another definitive cut, whether rational or irrational (21-4). Moreover, the continuity of the real number system ensures the findings of infinitesimal analysis by confirming the existence of definitive limit values, so that, for example, where a magnitude x grows continually but not beyond all limits, there will be a definitive value a that is the lowest value of a class U2 formed by a cut of ℜ and towards which the value of x will approach by passing through the infinite values of the lower class U1 without ever reaching it (24-7).
Despite claiming to have done otherwise, it is unclear that Dedekind ever provides his sought after rigorous arithmetic demonstration for the continuity and well-ordered character of real numbers. Irrational numbers are not derived from the four fundamental arithmetic operations, but instead are defined by reference to the cut, and only once they are so defined is it argued that the operations can be performed with them to yield the definitive results in the same way as numbers derived from those operations. The geometric crutch persists in the very notion of the cut, which not only derives from the figure of the diagonal of the square cutting the number line, but also borrows from the pictures associated with it in everyday language. It also remains a mere assumption on Dedekind's part that irrationals are indeed numbers, as this is not proven by the fact that operations performed on numbers can also be performed upon them, and it is only again with reference to the geometric image that a new number seems to be required wherever a point on the straight line corresponds to an incommensurable length. 15 Without this assumption, the well-ordered place of irrationals within the continuum rests solely on the image of the precise and well-placed cut of the straight line, as the wellordered rational numbers approach but never reach it, while, conversely, the endless and never repeating arithmetic expansion of each irrational means none are ever completely given but only approximated to rational numbers: even when π is calculated to two billion decimals, the result is still merely a rational number. An irrational number would then no longer be freely assignable as the definition of continuity demands. These considerations suggest the possibility of seeing irrational cuts as something other than well-ordered supplements that complete the continuity of the one-dimensional number line.
When Deleuze references Dedekind in Difference and Repetition, he attributes to the cut the power of constituting for the virtual 'the next genus of number, the ideal cause of continuity or the pure element of quantitatability' (Deleuze 1994: 172) , so that the virtual is a continuous multiplicity to which quantity nevertheless pertains. 16 When he later invokes the idea of the cut, however, focussing solely on the irrational cut, it plays a very different role of expressing a power of discontinuity and incommensurability. In The Fold, the irrational and the differential relation are invoked together, with the first being 'the common limit of two convergent series [of rational numbers], of which one has no maximum and the other no minimum [since no rational number is "nearest" to its irrational limit]', and the second being 'the common limit of the relation between two quantities that are vanishing [as dy and dx each approach 0]' (Deleuze 1993: 17) . What the irrational and the differential quotient share, however, is 'the presence of a curved element [that] acts as a cause' (17), this being illustrated by the figure Dedekind himself uses of the arc drawn from the diagonal descending onto and cutting the number line. But rather than demonstrating the complete and wellordered nature of the straight line, Deleuze maintains that it demonstrates its discontinuity and disparateness:
<EXT> The irrational number implies the descent of a circular arc on the straight line of rational points, and exposes the latter as a false infinity, a simple undefinite that includes an infinity of lacunae; that is why the continuous is a labyrinth that cannot be represented by a straight line. The straight line always has to be intermingled with curved lines. (17) In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze associates this same image with the eternal return understood not as a return of identical events in time but rather as the discontinuous structure of time itself: it is a 'straight-line labyrinth … "invisible, incessant"' (Deleuze 1994: 111) , but this disjointed line also 'reconstitutes an eternally decentred circle' (115) that ensures that only difference returns in time.
When Deleuze introduces the irrational cut as a modern film technique that 'determines the non-commensurable relations between images', and, as such, is 'no longer a lacuna that the associated images would be assumed to cross' (Deleuze 1989: 213) , he directly associates it with the mathematics of cuts:
<EXT> Cinema and mathematics are the same here: sometimes the cut, socalled rational, forms part of one of the two sets which it separates (end of one or beginning of the other). … Sometimes, as in modern cinema, the cut has become the interstice, it is irrational and does not form part of either set, one of which has no more an end than the other has a beginning: false continuity is such an irrational cut. (181) These cuts also relate directly to a Nietzschean 'power of the false' that is absent in
Bergsonian duration -it is unsurprising that Bergson disappears from Deleuze's analysis of cinema once the powers of the false are introduced -inasmuch as it 'poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts … inexplicable differences to the present and alternatives which are undecidable between true and false to the past' (131). While duration's continuity of virtual past and actual present 'concerned the order of time, that is, the coexistence of relations or the simultaneity of the elements internal to time', the power of the false 'concerns the series of time, which brings together the before and the after in a becoming, instead of separating them; its paradox is to introduce an enduring interval in the moment itself' (155). The irrational cut achieves this because even while the images it brings together are held in the same moment without any extensive separation, they remain out of sync with each other and thus never simultaneous. Recast here as a temporal determination, the irrational cut dovetails with the eternal return conceived by Deleuze as the structure of an out-of-sync time.
The irrational cut thus replaces flatness in smallest parts with the constitution of a 'disjunction of the two images, at the same time as their new type of relation, a relation of very precise incommensurability' (Deleuze 1989: 256) . It installs within rational continuous manifolds a principle of foundational irrational discontinuity. Its time as series expresses 'the intrinsic quality of that which becomes in time' (275). In this respect, while particular irrational cuts such as cinematic cuts may introduce difference, the irrational cut as a structure is not itself the production of the new but rather the guarantor of the possibility of novelty -it is what ensures that creative evolution is in fact creative. In this way, it is the internal, intensive difference and power on which duration depends. where 'quantity' would be more appropriate, though he does translate Grössenbestimmung in largely the same ways as White. Compare, for example, his translation of the last quote above, which has Riemann describing his project in the rather circular and unilluminating way as 'constructing the notion of a multiply extended magnitude out of general notions of magnitude' (Riemann 1882: 55-6 ).
The peculiarities of the translation used may not matter for the work done by these other authors, who, with the exception of Durie, neither engage in close readings of Riemann's text nor address its relation to Deleuze's early writings on Bergson (this is true of Calamari's article even though Deleuze's Bergsonism features in the title), but are generally focused instead on later Riemann-inspired developments in the history of mathematics and how these are taken up in Deleuze's later writings. Nevertheless, I suspect that certain problematic statements that seem to attribute to Riemann the view that continuous multiplicities are qualitative and non-metrical rather than quantitative, or that Euclidean geometry applies to discrete but not to continuous space (see Duffy 2013: 103-7; Durie 2004: 65 and 67n16; Plotnitsky 2006: 191 and 2009: 200) , may reflect the translation they are using.
The French translation of Riemann referenced by Deleuze (Riemann 1898: 280-299) seems in all cases to translate Grösse and its related terms with 'grandeur', which ordinarily refers to magnitude but whose mathematical usage, similarly to Grösse, denotes 'Quantité, tout ce qui est susceptible d'augmentation ou de diminution' (Littré 1957) . 4 'While I now attempt in the first place to solve the first of these problems, the development of the concept of manifolds multiply extended, I think myself the more entitled to ask considerate judgment inasmuch as I have had little practise in such matters of a philosophical nature, where the difficulty lies more in the concepts than in the construction' (Riemann 1929: 412) . It should be noted that Deleuze's many invocations of mathematics almost always involve texts or ideas that expressly concern the philosophical foundations of mathematics. As such, his references to mathematics do not serve to provide a ground for philosophical concepts or offer ideas analogous to those concepts, nor do they serve as a form of speculative construction of such concepts. Rather, they articulate philosophical problems that appear alongside or subjacent to the mathematical domain.
5 Hence the individual modes of a continuous manifold are 'points' and those of a discrete manifold are 'elements' (Riemann 1929: 412) , and the determinate parts of a manifold can be distinguished either by a superficial 'mark' or a substantive 'boundary' (413).
6 Thus, in a Euclidean space, given two points positioned at X0,Y0, Z0 and X1,Y1, Z1, the distance S between them is √(X1 -X0) 2 + (Y1 -Y0) 2 + (Z1 -Z0) 2 , and similarly with a higher number of dimensions. To assume the flatness of the smallest parts is to assume that this formulation holds at an infinitesimal level even though the manifold's curvature or stretch may preclude this at greater magnitudes -in short, that ds = √dx 2 + dy 2 + dz 2 +….
7 See, for example, Bergson (1983: 142-58; 1991: 206; 1998: 154-57) , and also Bergson's assertion in his Latin thesis that for Aristotle the division of a body into parts containing other parts 'will go on into infinity' (Bergson 1970: 70) . 8 On this point see Widder (2012) . 9 Bergson's critique of Einstein, however, is directed at the special theory of relativity, which does not consider gravity, whereas it is Einstein's general theory of relativity that builds on Riemann's thought. 10 Compare with Bergson's early critique of the concept of intensive quantities as being one for which, while
'not admitting of measure … it can nevertheless be said that it is greater or less than another intensity' (Bergson 1910: 3). Bergson's response is that this is self-contradictory, since 'as soon as a thing is acknowledged to be capable of increase and decrease, it seems natural to ask by how much it decreases or by how much it increases' (72). Against this, Deleuze contends that Bergson's critique is ambiguous, as it is unclear that it is 'directed against the very notion of intensive quantity' rather than 'merely against the idea of an intensity of psychic states' (Deleuze 1991a: 91-2) . It is from this purported ambiguity that Deleuze suggests that some form of quantity remains in Bergson's notion of qualitative duration (92-4).
